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Abstract
This paper studies the relations between the weight of each player and his allocation in com-
munication situations with asymmetry. In some important classes of games such as convex or
superadditive games, the weighted Myerson value which is an extension of the Myerson value for
communication situations with asymmetry is not weight monotonic, that is, the relatively increase
of one player’s weight may not increase his allocation. By extending the position value and the
component-wise egalitarian value, we define and axiomatize new allocation rules both of which is
weight monotonic in much wider classes of games, specifically, in superadditive and zero-monotonic
games respectively.
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1 Introduction
One of the most useful and attractive solution concepts of the cooperative games with transferable utility
is the Shapley value which is introduced by Shapley (1953b). The Shapley value is originally defined as
each player’s expected marginal contributions among all permutations of the player set. This definition
is closely related to fair treatment of all players, that is, the probability of one player follows the other
player is equal to that of the other player follows the player. By this property, in the Shapley value, the
influence of cooperation of a set of players is equally divided among them. In real economic or social
situations, however, the gain (or loss) generated by players cooperation may not be divided equally
among them. For instance, consider the case in which one big firm and one small firm cooperates in a
joint project. Suppose both of them cannot generate any profit by their own, the gain by cooperation is
divided equally in the Shapley value. Yet if one firm need a greater effort in the project than the other,
the equal division may be unfair in some sense. In that case, the gain should be divided proportionally
to each of their effort. Thus, the modification of the Shapley value to satisfy more fair sense like the
above is needed when we consider the application.
The Shapley value is characterized by four axioms, efficiency, the null player property, symmetry
and additivity. The discussion above corresponds to weaken symmetry. Weakening symmetry is first
considered by Shapley (1953a). He used weights of players and defined the weighted Shapley value.1
These weights were introduced for the sake of reflection of players’ bargaining power, however, Owen
(1968) noticed that the weights are interpret as players’ slowness to reach the game rather than players’
bargaining power since the relatively increase of one player’s weight may decrease his allocation. Then,
the weighted Shapley value is not an appropriate allocation rule of the situation in the above.
The interpretation of weights is closely related to how to use the weights in the definition of the
allocation rule. Thus, if we consider another allocation rule, weights may be interpreted as bargaining
∗Graduate school of Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan. E-mail:
kongo takumi@toki.waseda.jp
1Kalai and Samet (1987) also considered the weighted Shapley value but, in their definition, they used the weight
system which is a generalization of the weights.
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power.2 By generalizing the position value which is introduced by Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992) and the
component-wise egalitarian value which is introduced by Slikker (2007), we define two allocation rules
for the communication situations with asymmetry. The communication situations with asymmetry are
more general settings than the settings in which the weighted Shapley value is defined. The allocation
rule for the communication situations with asymmetry which corresponds to the weighted Shapley value
is the weighted Myerson value introduced by Haeringer (1999), Thus we use the weighted Myerson value
to compare our allocation rules and the weighted Shapley value.
The paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2, basic notations and definitions are given. In
Section 3, the new allocation rule on communication situations with asymmetry is given and it is called
weighted position value. In Section 4, another allocation rule is defined and it is called the weighted
component-wise egalitarian value. In Section 5, each allocation rules are reconsidered with respect to
the relation between weights and bargaining power which is called weight monotonicity. In Section 6,
examples of the allocation rules are given.
2 Preliminaries
A finite setN is given and it denotes the set of all players. Let |N | = n where |·| represents the cardinality
of the set. A function v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0 is called a cooperative game with transferable utility or
simply, a game. A game v is zero-normalized if for any i ∈ N , v({i}) = 0. Throughout this paper, we
consider only zero-normalized games. A set of all zero-normalized games on N is denoted by VN .
For any S ⊆ N , let uS : 2N → R be a S-unanimity game which is defined as follows: for any T ⊆ N ,
uS(T ) =
{
1 if S ⊆ T
0 otherwise
.
It is well known that any v ∈ VN is represented as a linear combination of unanimity games, that is,
v =
∑
S⊆N ;S 6=∅
∆v(S)uS
where ∆v(S) =
∑
T⊆S(−1)|S|−|T |v(T ) is dividend of S.
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953b)) of a game v is a function φ : VN → Rn which is defined as:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N ;S3i
∆v(S)
|S|
for any i ∈ N .
To each player in N , we associate a weight wi ∈ R++ and denotes w = (wi)i∈N . The weights of
players add some information to the games, for instance, bargaining ability of each player or the size of
each player if each player is a group of individuals. The weighted Shapley value φw (Shapley (1953b))
is defined as follows: for any i ∈ N ,
φwi (v) =
∑
S⊆N ;S3i
∆v(S)
wi∑
j∈S wj
.
Next, we consider communication relation between players of the games. Given a player set N , the
bilateral communication channels between the players in N are described by a graph g ⊆ {{i, j}|i, j ∈
N, i 6= j}. A set of all graphs on N is denoted by GN . Each communication channel in a graph is called
a link and it is represented as ij instead of {i, j}. Given a graph g, if there exists a finite sequence of
players i1, . . . , iH such that i1 = i, iH = j and ihih+1 ∈ g for any h = 1, . . . , H − 1, then i is connected
to j in the graph. Given a graph, any players can communicate freely with each other iff they are
connected with each other. Let
N/g = {{j ∈ N |i is connected to j in g} ∪ {i}|i ∈ N}.
2Haeringer (2006) used the weight schemes which is introduced from weight and enabled us to interpret them as
bargaining power.
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N/g represents the collection of communicable players in g. If a link ij is deleted from a graph g, we
write g − ij. For any S ⊆ N , let g(S) = {ij ∈ g|i, j ∈ S} which is a restriction of g on S. By g(S), S/g
is defined in the same manner as N/g, that is,
S/g = {{j ∈ S|i is connected to j in g(S)} ∪ {i}|i ∈ S}.
A pair (v, g) is called a communication situation. An allocation rule on communication situations
with asymmetry is a n-dimensional vector value function on VN × GN × Rn++. By extending the
Myerson value which is introduced by Myerson (1977), Haeringer (1999) defined an allocation rule µw
on communication situations with asymmetry as the following way: for any i ∈ N ,
µw(v, g) = φw(vg),
where vg(S) =
∑
C∈S/g v(C) for any S ⊆ N .3 It is called the weighted Myerson value. The weighted
Myerson value is characterized by two axioms each of which relates to efficiency and balance of contri-
butions respectively.
3 Weighted position value
In this section, we define another allocation rule on communication situations with asymmetry. First, we
give two properties which allocation rules should satisfy. Let ψ be an allocation rule on communication
situations with asymmetry.
Component efficiency (CE): ψ satisfies component efficiency iff for any v ∈ VN , any g ∈ GN , any
w ∈ Rn++ and any C ∈ N/g, ∑
i∈C
ψi(v, g, w) = v(C).
Weighted balanced link contributions (WBLC): ψ satisfies weighted balanced link contributions
iff for any v ∈ VN , any g ∈ GN , any w ∈ Rn++ and any i, j ∈ N ,∑
jk∈gj
wj
wj + wk
[
ψi(v, g, w)− ψi(v, g − jk, w)
]
=
∑
ih∈gi
wi
wi + wh
[
ψj(v, g, w)− ψj(v, g − ih, w)
]
,
where gk = {kh ∈ g|h ∈ N} for any k = i, j.
CE is straightforward, that is, all of the value generated by each set of communicable players must
divide among them. While WBLC is rather complicated. First, for any ih ∈ g, wiwi+wh is considered as
i’s bargaining power in the link. Suppose that each player can cut each of his link with probability which
is equal to his bargaining power of the link, then wiwi+wh (ψj(v, g, w) − ψj(v, g − ih, w) is interpreted as
j’s expected influence from i by deletion of link ih. Thus WBLC implies that for any two players, the
sum of the expected influence from one to the other among all of one’s link need to be balanced between
them. If all players have the same weight in w, that is, wi = wj for any i, j ∈ N , WBLC coincides with
balanced link contributions in Slikker (2005).
Then, the followings holds.
Theorem 1. There exists a unique allocation rule piw which satisfies CE and WBLC. The allocation
rule is defined as follows: for any i ∈ N
piw(v, g) =
∑
ij∈gi
wi
wi + wj
φij(r)
where r : 2g → R is called a link game such that for any g′ ⊆ g, r(g′) =∑C∈N/g′ v(C).
3Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) considered more general settings where asymmetry is represented by weight
system introduced by Kalai and Samet (1987).
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Proof. The following proof is a modification of the proof of Theorem 3.1 of Slikker (2005).
First, we identify that piw satisfies CE and WBLC. For CE, for any C ∈ N/g,∑
k∈C
piwk (v, g) =
∑
ij∈g(C)
( wi
wi + wj
+
wj
wi + wj
)
φij(r)
=
∑
ij∈g(C)
φij(r|g(C)) = r(g(C)) =
∑
T∈N/g(C)
v(T ) = v(C).
In the above equation, the second equality holds since for any ij ∈ g(C) and any g′ ⊆ g − ij, the
marginal contributions of ij to g′ are equal to those of ij to g′ ∩ g(C) and the last equality holds since
v is zero-normalized.
For WBLC, for any i, j ∈ N ,∑
jk∈gj
wj
wj + wk
(piwi (v, g)− piwi (v, g − jk))
=
∑
jk∈gj
wj
wj + wk
(∑
ih∈gi
wi
wi + wh
∑
g′⊆g
g′3ih
∆r(g′)
|g′| −
∑
ih∈(g−jk)i
wi
wi + wh
∑
g′⊆g−jk
g′3ih
∆r|g−jk(g
′)
|g′|
)
=
∑
jk∈gj
wj
wj + wk
(∑
g′⊆g
∆r(g′)
|g′|
∑
ih∈g′i
wi
wi + wh
−
∑
g′⊆g−jk
∆r|g−jk(g
′)
|g′|
∑
ih∈g′i
wi
wi + wh
)
=
∑
jk∈gj
wj
wj + wk
∑
g′⊆g
g′3jk
∆r(g′)
|g′|
∑
ih∈g′i
wi
wi + wh
=
∑
g′⊆g
∑
jk∈g′j
wj
wj + wk
∆r(g′)
|g′|
∑
ih∈g′i
wi
wi + wh
=
∑
g′⊆g
∑
ih∈g′i
wi
wi + wh
∆r(g′)
|g′|
∑
jk∈g′j
wj
wj + wk
=
∑
ih∈gi
wi
wi + wh
(piwj (v, g)− piwj (v, g − ih)).
To prove the uniqueness, let ψ be an allocation rule which satisfies CE and WBLC. The proof is
by induction of the number of links in g. If g = ∅, CE implies ψ(v, g, w) = v({i}) = piw(v, g) for any
i ∈ N thus, ψ = piw. Let m ≥ 1. Suppose that ψ = piw holds for any graph which contains less than
m − 1 links and consider the case g contains m links. Fix C ∈ N/g. If C is singleton, CE implies
ψ(v, g, w) = v({i}) = piw(v, g) for i ∈ C. If |C| ≥ 2, without loss of generality, let C = {1, 2, . . . , c}.
Applying WBLC to pairs {1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, c}, we obtain∑
2k∈g2
w2
w2 + wk
ψ1(v, g, w)−
∑
1h∈g1
w1
w1 + wh
ψ2(v, g, w)
=
∑
2k∈g2
w2
w2 + wk
ψ1(v, g − 2k,w)−
∑
1h∈g1
w1
w1 + wh
ψ2(v, g − 1h,w)
=
∑
2k∈g2
w2
w2 + wk
piw1 (v, g − 2k)−
∑
1h∈g1
w1
w1 + wh
piw2 (v, g − 1h);
...∑
ck∈gc
wc
wc + wk
ψ1(v, g, w)−
∑
1h∈g1
w1
w1 + wh
ψc(v, g, w)
=
∑
ck∈gc
wc
wc + wk
ψ1(v, g − ck, w)−
∑
1h∈g1
w1
w1 + wh
ψc(v, g − 1h,w)
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=
∑
ck∈gc
wc
wc + wk
piw1 (v, g − ck)−
∑
1h∈g1
w1
w1 + wh
piwc (v, g − 1h);
Also, by CE, ∑
i∈C
ψi(v, g, w) = v(C).
These c equalities form a regular system of linear equations in c variables and it has a unique solution
which is the weighted position value. Hence for any i ∈ C, ψi coincides with piwi . For any i ∈ C ′ ∈ N/g
with C ′ 6= C we can prove the coincidence between ψ and piw in the same way. By induction of m, the
proof is completed.
If all players have the same weight in w, piw coincides with the position value introduced by Borm,
Owen, and Tijs (1992). Thus, we call piw the weighted position value.
4 Weighted component-wise egalitarian value
In this section, replacing WBLC with the following property, we define another allocation rule on the
communication situations with asymmetry.
Weighted balanced component contributions (WBCC): ψ satisfies weighted balanced compo-
nent contributions iff for any v ∈ VN , any g ∈ GN , any w ∈ Rn++ and any i, j ∈ N ,
wj(ψi(v, g, w)− ψi(v, g\g(Cj), w)) = wi(ψj(v, g, w)− ψj(v, g\g(Ci), w))
where Ck ∈ N/g with Ck 3 k for any k = i, j.
Theorem 2. There exists a unique allocation rule γw which satisfies CE and WBCC. The allocation
rule is defined as follows: for any i ∈ N with i ∈ C ∈ N/g,
γwi (v, g) =
wi∑
j∈C wj
v(C).
Proof. First, we identify that γw satisfies CE and WBCC. For CE, for any C ∈ N/g,∑
i∈C
γwi (v, g) =
∑
i∈C
wi∑
j∈C wj
v(C) = v(C).
For WBCC, for any i, j ∈ N , if Ci = Cj = C, then
wj(γwi (v, g)− γwi (v, g\g(Cj))) = wj
( wi∑
k∈C wk
v(C)− 0
)
=
wj · wi∑
k∈C wk
v(C)
= wi
( wj∑
k∈C wk
v(C)− 0
)
= wi(γwj (v, g)− γwj (v, g\g(Ci))),
and if Ci 6= Cj ,
wj(γwi (v, g)− γwi (v, g\g(Cj))) = 0 = wi(γwj (v, g)− γwj (v, g\g(Ci))).
To prove the uniqueness, let ψ be an allocation rule which satisfies CE and WBCC. Let g ∈ GN and
C ∈ N/g. If |C| = 1, then CE implies ψi(g, v, w) = v({i}) = γwi (g, v) for i ∈ C. Suppose |C| ≥ 2 and
fix i ∈ C. By applying WBCC to pairs i and any j ∈ C\{i}, and the fact that ψk(v, g\g(C), w) = 0 for
any k ∈ C, we obtain
wjψi(v, g, w) = wiψj(v, g, w)
for any j ∈ C\{i}. Summing up the above equation with respect to j ∈ C\{i}, we have∑
j∈C\{i}
wjψi(v, g, w) = wi
∑
j∈C\{i}
ψj(v, g, w)
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By CE,
∑
j∈C\{i} ψi(v, g, w) = v(C)− ψi(v, g, w). Thus, the above equation is equal to
ψi(v, g, w) =
wi∑
j∈C wj
v(C) = γwi (v, g).
For any j ∈ C\{i}, we can prove the coincidence between ψj(v, g, w) and γwj (v, g) in the same way.
Hence ψ = γw.
If all players have the same weight in w, γw coincides with the component-wise egalitarian value
introduced by Slikker (2007). Thus, we call γw weighted component-wise egalitarian value.
5 Weight monotonicity
In this section, we reconsider the meaning of the weights of players. The weights are first introduced
to games by Shapley (1953a) in order to represent bargaining power of each player. However, Owen
(1968) noticed that, in the weighted Shapley value, the weights are interpreted as each player’s slowness
to reach the game rather than bargaining power since relatively increasing of one player’s weight may
decreases his allocation. (The 3-person majority game given in the next section illustrates this property.)
The interpretation of the weights is closely related to how to use the weights in the definition of a
allocation rule. For the weighted Shapley value, the weights does not imply their bargaining power but
in other allocation rule, the weights may be interpreted as their bargaining power. Also if we consider
some specific class games, the weights may be interpreted as the bargaining power. In order to consider
the relation between the weights and bargaining power, we use the following property:
Weight monotonicity: An allocation rule ψ satisfies weight monotonicity in V¯N ⊆ VN iff for any
w,w′ ∈ Rn++ which satisfies wi = w′i for any i ∈ N\{j} and wj < w′j , any v ∈ V¯N and any
g ∈ GN ,
ψj(v, g, w) < ψj(v, g, w′).
When we consider weight monotonicity, it is important that we consider what class of games. We
consider the following classes of games. A game v is zero-monotonic if for any i ∈ N and S ⊆ N\{i},
v(S∪{i}) ≥ v(S)+v({i}). A game v is superadditive if for any S, T ⊆ N with S∩T = ∅, v(S∪T ) ≥ v(S)+
v(T ). A game is convex if for any i ∈ N and for any S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i}, v(S∪{i})−v(S) ≤ v(T∪{i})−v(T ).
By definition, convex games are superadditive and superadditive games are zero-monotonic.
The first result needs restriction on graph. Given a graph, a sequence of players (i1, i2, . . . , iK) with
K ≥ 3 called a cycle if ikik+1 ∈ g for all k = 1, . . .K− 1 and iK = i1. A graph is cycle-complete if there
exists a cycle in a graph then all pairs of players in the cycle has link in the graph. Then, the following
holds.
Theorem 3. If g is cycle-complete, the weighted Myerson value satisfies weight monotonicity in the
class of convex games.
Proof. By van den Nouweland and Borm (1991), if v is convex and g is cycle-complete, vg is convex.
Monderer, Samet, and Shapley (1992) showed that if the game is convex, the weighted Shapley value
satisfies weight monotonicity. Hence the theorem holds.
By strengthening the condition of game, we will drop the restriction on graph.
Definition 1 (k-convexity). Let k ≥ 1. A game v is k-convex if for any i ∈ N and for any S ⊆ T ⊆
N\{i}, v(S ∪ {i})− kv(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− kv(T ).
For k-convexity, the followings hold.
Lemma 1. If v is k-convex, v(S) ≤ v(T ) holds for any S ⊆ T ⊆ N .
Proof. Since we consider only zero-normalized game, when S = ∅, the definition of k-convexity implies
v(T ∪ {i}) ≥ kv(T ) for any T ⊆ N\{i}. For any S ⊆ T ⊆ N , let T\S = {i1, i2, . . . , ir}. Then,
v(T ) ≥ kv(T\{i1}) ≥ k2v(T\{i1, i2}) ≥ · · · ≥ krv(T\{i1, i2, . . . , ir}) = krv(S) ≥ v(S)
where the last inequality holds since k ≥ 1.
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Lemma 2. If v is k-convex, then v is convex.
Proof. Rearranging the equation in the definition of the k-convexity, for any i ∈ N and for any S ⊆
T ⊆ N\{i} we have
v(T ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ k(v(T )− v(S)).
Lemma 1 and k ≥ 1 implies k(v(T )− v(S)) ≥ v(T )− v(S) which completes the proof.
By Lemma 2, k-convexity is the stronger condition than convexity. If k ≥ 1 +√2, we can drop the
restriction on graph in Theorem 3 by k-convexity. The next lemma is needed to obtain the result.
Lemma 3. If v is k-convex and k ≥ 1+√2, then for any i ∈ N and any S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i}, any partition
S of S and any partition T of T ,
v(T ∪ {i})−
∑
Th∈T
v(Th) ≥ v(S ∪ {i})−
∑
Sk∈S
v(Sk).
Proof. By k-convexity,
v(T ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ k(v(T )− v(S)) ≥ v(T ) + v(S) + (k − 1)v(T )− (k + 1)v(S).
By Lemma 2, k-convexity implies superadditivity. Hence,
v(T ) + v(S) + (k − 1)v(T )− (k + 1)v(S) ≥
∑
Th∈T
v(Th) +
∑
Sk∈S
v(Sk) + (k − 1)v(T )− (k + 1)v(S).
Let T\S = {i1 . . . , im}. k-convexity implies v(T ) ≥ kmv(S). Thus,
(k − 1)v(T )− (k + 1)v(S) ≥ (km(k − 1)− (k + 1))v(S).
Since k ≥ 1 +√2,
km(k − 1)− (k + 1) ≥ k(k − 1)− (k + 1) = (k − (1 +
√
2))(k − (1−
√
2)) ≥ 0
holds for any m ≥ 0 which completes the proof.
Theorem 4. If k ≥ 1 +√2, the weighted Myerson value satisfies weight monotonicity in the class of
k-convex games.
Proof. By proof pf Theorem 3, it is sufficient to prove that if v is k-convex and k ≥ 1+√2, vg is convex
for any graph.
Let i ∈ N , S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i} and g ∈ GN . Let
C = {C ∈ S/g| there exists j ∈ C such that ij ∈ g(S ∪ {i})}.
By definition, each elements of C is an element of S/g. Moreover, ⋃C∈C C ∈ (S ∪ {i})/g that is, all
players in an element C is connected with each other through adding i to S. Similarly, let
D = {D ∈ T/g| there exists j ∈ D such that ij ∈ g(T ∪ {i})}.
Then,
vg(T∪{i})−vg(T )−(vg(S∪{i})−vg(S)) = v
(
{i}∪
⋃
D∈D
v(D)
)
−
∑
D∈D
v(D)−
(
v
(
{i}∪
⋃
C∈C
C
)
−
∑
C∈C
v(C)
)
Any players who are connected with each other in S/g is also connected with each other in T/g. Thus,⋃
D∈DD ⊇
⋃
C∈C C. By Lemma 3, the above equation is greater than zero which implies v
g is convex
for any g ∈ GN .
For the weighted position value and the weighted component-wise egalitarian value, the followings
hold.
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Theorem 5. The weighted position value satisfies weight monotonicity in the class of superadditive
games.
Proof. Since v is superadditive, for any ij ∈ g and any g′ ⊆ g − ij,
r(g′ ∪ {ij}) =
∑
C∈N/(g′∪{ij})
v(C) ≥
∑
C∈N/g′
v(C) = r(g′).
This implies for any ij ∈ g, marginal contributions to any g′ ⊆ g− ij is positive thus, the Shapley value
of any ij is greater than 0.4 Since w′i = wi, for any i ∈ N and w′j > wj ,
piw
′
j (v, g)− piwj (v, g) =
∑
ji∈gj
w′j
w′j + w
′
i
φji(r)−
∑
ji∈gj
wj
wj + wi
φji(r)
=
∑
ji∈gj
wi(w′j − wj)
(w′j + w
′
i)(wj + wi)
φji(r) ≥ 0.
Theorem 6. The weighted component-wise egalitarian value satisfies weight monotonicity in the class
of zero-monotonic games.
Proof. Now we consider only zero-normalized game, zero monotonicity implies v(S) ≥ 0 for any S ⊆ N .
Since w′i = wi, for any i ∈ N and w′j > wj ,
γw
′
j (v, g) − γwj (v, g) =
( w′j∑
i∈C w
′
i
− wj∑
i∈C wi
)
v(C) =
(w′j − wj)(
∑
i∈C\{j} wi)∑
i∈C w
′
i ·
∑
i∈C wi
v(C) ≥ 0.
Thus, if an allocation rule is appropriate, the weights can be interpreted as players bargaining power.
6 Examples
In this section two examples are given to illustrate the results in the previous section.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) =
v(N) = 1, g = {12, 13, 23}, w = (1, 1, 1) and w′ = (1, 3, 1).
In Example 1, v is superadditive but not convex. µw(v, g) = ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) and µ
w′(v, g) = ( 720 ,
6
20 ,
7
20 )
implies µw2 (v, g) > µ
w′
2 (v, g) though w2 < w
′
2. While pi
w(v, g) = ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) and pi
w′(v, g) = ( 14 ,
2
4 ,
1
4 )
implies piw2 (v, g) < pi
w′
2 (v, g).
Example 2. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = v({4}) = 0, v({2, 3}) = 1, v({1, 2}) =
v({1, 3}) = v({1, 4}) = v({2, 4}) = v({3, 4}) = v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = v({2, 3, 4}) =
v(N) = 3, g = {12, 23, 34}, w = (10, 1, 1, 1) and w′ = (10, 2, 1, 1).
In Example 2, v is zero-monotonic but not superadditive. piw(v, g) = ( 2011 ,− 722 , 12 , 1) and piw
′
(v, g) =
( 53 ,− 13 , 23 , 1) implies piw2 (v, g) > piw
′
2 (v, g) though w2 < w
′
2. While γ
w(v, g) = ( 3013 ,
3
13 ,
3
13 ,
3
13 ) and
γw
′
(v, g) = ( 3014 ,
6
14 ,
3
14 ,
3
14 ) implies γ
w
2 (v, g) < γ
w′
2 (v, g).
Acknowledgment
The author thanks Yukihiko Funaki for helpful comments. All remaining errors are my own responsi-
bility.
4The original definition of the Shapley value is an expected marginal contributions of each player (see Shapley (1953b)).
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